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T HE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 
1993.1 Article 1 of the ICTY Statute states: "The International Tribunal shall 
have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present 
Statute." The provisions that follow in the ICTY Statute give the Tribunal 
specific subject,matter jurisdiction over grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 (Article 2), violations of the laws or customs of war 
(Article 3), genocide (Article 4), and crimes against humanity (Article 5). 
There is little doubt that the decisions and practice of the ICTY and of its 
sister tribunal, the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ITR)2 will have a 
significant impact on the development of the law of armed conflict. Judicial 
decisions are a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international 
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law, not a source of law equivalent to treaties, custom or general principles of 
law. Further, there is no rule of precedent in international law as. such. The 
decisions and practice of the lCTY, if they are to have a positive impact on the 
development of the law of armed conflict, must persuade external decision 
makers such as foreign ministry officials, officials in international organizations, 
other judges, military officers, and academic critics of their relevance and 
utility. Judicial decisions affect the development of the law of armed conflict 
insofar as they address legal lacunae (treaty negotiators can and do accept gaps 
in the law-judges cannot), as they add flesh to the bare bones of treaty 
provisions or to skeletal legal concepts such as military necessity or 
proportionality, and as they identify and give legitimacy to new legal 
developments, such as emergent custom. 
Applying its own statute, some of the Tribunal's decisions will be statute 
dependent and of limited relevance to the general development of the law of 
armed conflict.3 The lCTY has developed its own approach to procedural and 
evidentiary issues, topics essentially unaddressed in the law of armed conflict. 
Further, the Tribunal is concerned exclusively with offenses occurring in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia. At times, one might regard the various 
factual scenarios as having been drafted for an exceptionally difficult Jessup 
moot court competition. One is, however, constantly reminded of the bitter 
reality of devastation and death that compelled the creation of the Tribunal. 
The complexity of the situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia has 
compelled the Tribunal to devote substantial parts of most of its decisions to 
determining the nature of the conflict and the content of the body of applicable 
law. The law of armed conflict has been drafted by and agreed to 
by representatives of States. The applicability of this body of law is dependent 
upon the classification of a particular conflict. A relatively elaborate body of 
law applies during international conflicts; a much more skeletal body of law 
applies to internal conflicts. 
This "two box" approach to the law is rooted in the reluctance of many 
states to accept what they perceive to be interference in their internal affairs. 
One might query why States would wish to do worse things to their own 
citizens in an internal conflict than to foreigners in an international conflict. 
Bearing in mind the complexity of the conflict(s) in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia and the similar complexity of many other contemporary conflicts, 
one might also query the continuing utility of the approach. The 
analytical contortions of the lCTY judges on the subject both demonstrate the 
need for a unified approach and suggest how such an approach might evolve. 
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As of 31 December 1997, the ICTY has confirmed twenty public indictments 
naming seventy,four indictees," including three Muslims, fifteen Croats and 
fifty,six Serbs. It had ninteen indictees in custody, including three Muslims, 
four Serbs and twelve Croats. One trial, that of Dusko Tadic, a Bosnian Serb, 
had been completed, and the conviction was being appealed. One indictee, 
Drazen Erdemovic, a Bosnian Croat fighting on the Bosnian Serb side, 
submitted a guilty plea but then appealed his sentence. Two other trials were 
ongoing-that ofTimofil Blaskic, a Bosnian Croat, and the joint trial of Hazim 
Delic, Esad Landzo, Zdravko Mucic, and Zejnil Delalic, three Bosnian Muslims 
and one Bosnian Croat. In addition, two trials, those of Zlatko Aleksovski, a 
Bosnian Croat, and Zlavko Dokmanovic, a Croatian Serb, were scheduled to 
start in January 1998, with several others to follow. The Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICTY has made a conscientious effort to devote 
resources to investigate offenses allegedly committed by Croats, Muslims, and 
Serbs in an evenhanded fashion. A glance at the list of indictees indicates that 
to date: (a) a substantial majority of the indictees are Serbs (usually from 
Bosnia), a significant number of the indictees are Croats (also usually from 
Bosnia), and a small number of the indictees are Bosnian Muslims; and (b) all 
of the Muslim indictees and almost all of the Croat indictees, but very few of 
the Serb indictees, are now in custody. 
Two comments about the approach of the OTP to investigations and 
indictments are necessary. First, the vast number of alleged offenses committed 
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and the limited resources of the OTP 
mandate a selective rather than a comprehensive approach. The basic 
preference has been to conduct investigations related to persons of particular 
importance, to particularly atrocious incidents, or to persons alleged to be 
responsible for particularly heinous acts. Inasmuch as investigations are 
continuing, the fact that certain persons have not yet been indicted is not 
necessarily significant. The availability of evidence or of an accused has 
occasionally affected decisions to conduct investigations. The OTP conducts 
its own investigations; it cannot and does not rely on untested information 
provided by others. Second, because of the complexity of the conflict and the 
fact that the ICTY Statute does not address the issue of included offenses, 
indictments have tended to include three types of charges for each alleged 
incident: an Article 2 (grave breaches) charge if the prosecution can establish 
the conflict is international, an Article 3 (violation of the laws or customs of 
war) charge if the conflict is determined to be internal, and an Article 5 (crimes 
against humanity) charge if the prosecution can establish that the offense 
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occurred within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against the 
civilian population. 
To date, the lCTY has contributed to the development of the law of armed 
conflict by its decisions related to the application of the grave breach provisions 
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949; to the scope of the concept of violations of 
the laws or customs of war, particularly in internal conflicts; to the meaning 
and scope of crimes against humanity; to the scope of individual criminal 
responsibility, including the doctrine of command responsibility; and to 
potential defenses, including duress and the doctrine of reprisals. This article 
discusses each of these issues in tum. It will conclude with an assessment of 
probable future developments. 
Application of the Grave Breach Provisions 
Article 2 of the lCTY Statute gives the Tribunal the power to prosecute 
persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions 
indicates that the Conventions apply in their entirety to all armed conflicts 
involving one or more High Contracting Parties on each side; to all cases of 
total or partial occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party by the 
forces of another High Contracting Party; and to armed conflicts with Powers 
which are not parties to the Conventions if these Powers accept and apply the 
provisions thereof. A reasonable argument can be made that the grave breach 
provisions are part of customary law and apply to all international conflicts.5 In 
any event, the Geneva Conventions applied throughout the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia during the period of conflict as a matter of treaty obligation.6 
It should also be noted that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 
which applies to conflicts, encourages parties to such 
conflicts to enter into special agreements to bring into force all or part of the 
other provisions of the Conventions. All of the parties to the conflict have 
entered into a web of special agreements pursuant to Common Article 3 or to 
other general principles of humanitarian law.7 
Unfortunately, simply stating that the sovereign entities in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia were bound by the Geneva Conventions as a matter of 
treaty or custom does not resolve the issue of whether or not the grave breach 
provisions were relevant. At various times: (a) the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY), which was succeeded on 29 April 1992 by the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), was engaged in armed conflict against one or 
more of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia; (b) Croatia was engaged in armed 
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conflict against the SFRY, the so,called Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), the 
FRY, and Bosniaj (c) Bosnia was engaged in armed conflict against the SFRY, 
the FRY, the Republika Srpska (RS), Croatia, the HVO (the Bosnian,Croat 
entity), and the Bosnian Muslim faction controlled by Fikret Abdicj and (d) 
Slovenia was engaged in armed conflict with the SFRY. One is tempted to cut 
the Gordian knot and simply argue that all the fighting that occurred in the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995 was part of one large 
international conflict. It is difficult, however, to fit all the fighting into an 
international armed conflict framework. As one example, it is difficult to see 
how the fighting between the Bosnian government and the Abdic faction can 
be regarded as part of an international conflict. 
The decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 
(hereinafter TadicJurisdiction Decision) rendered on 2 October 1995 gave the 
Appeals Chamber a first opportunity to address the conflict classification 
issue.8 The offenses with which Tadic was charged occurred in Bosnia in 1992j 
they involved a Bosnian Serb perpetrator and Bosnian Croat or Muslim 
victims. 
At the trial level, the defense argued that the conflict in issue was not 
international and that there were no Common Article 3 agreements bringing 
the grave breach provisions into effect.9 The prosecutor argued that for a 
variety of reasons the conflict was international and, to the extent the conflict 
had internal aspects, the grave breach provisions applied as a result of relevant 
Common Article 3 agreements.10 The United States, in an amicus brief, argued 
that the events in the former Yugoslavia should be regarded as parts of a single 
international conflict and that violations of Common Article 3 could be 
prosecuted under the grave breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions.11 
On appeal, the prosecution also argued that the Security Council had 
determined that the in the former Yugoslavia was international and 
that this determination should be given full effect.12 
The Appeals Chamber declined to decide on the nature of the conflict, 
leaving the issue to be resolved as a matter of mixed fact and law by the Trial 
Chamber. It did indicate in its decision that classification was a complex issue 
and that the Security Council was also aware of this complexity. 
[W]e conclude that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have both internal 
and international aspects, that the members of the Security Council clearly had 
both aspects of the conflicts in mind when they adopted the Statute of the 
International Tribunal, and that they intended to empower the International 
Tribunal to adjudicate violations of humanitarian law that occurred in either 
contextY 
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The Appeals Chamber went on to adopt a relatively conservative approach to 
Article 2 of the ICTY Statute, deciding that "in the present state of 
development of the law, Article 2 of the Statute only applies to offences 
committed within the context ofinternational armed conflicts."14 The majority 
observed further: 
Since it cannot be contended that the Bosnian Serbs constitute a State, arguably 
the classification just referred to would be based on the implicit assumption that 
the Bosnian Serbs are acting not as a rebellious entity but as organs or agents of 
another State, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro). As a 
consequence, serious infringements of international humanitarian law 
committed by the government army of Bosnia-Herzegovina against Bosnian 
Serbian civilians in their power would not be regarded as "grave breaches," 
because such civilians, having the nationality of Bosnia-Herzegovina, would not 
be regarded as "protected persons" under Article 4, paragraph 1 of Geneva 
Convention IV. By contrast, atrocities committed by Bosnian Serbs against 
Bosnian civilians in their hands would be regarded as "grave breaches," because 
such civilians would be "protected persons" under the Convention, in that the 
Bosnian Serbs would be acting as organs or agents of another State, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) of which the Bosnians would not 
possess the nationality. This would be, of course, an absurd outcome, in that it 
would place the Bosnian Serbs at a substantial legal disadvantage vis-it-vis the 
central authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.1s 
This particular observation, although unnecessary to the decision and of 
debatable accuracy, has had a substantial impact on consideration of the issue 
by the various trial chambers in subsequent cases. 
Although the defense would appear to have conceded the point and the 
prosecution argued in support of it, the Chamber was unwilling to consider the 
possibility of prosecuting under Article 2 of the Statute for grave breaches 
occurring in an internal conflict if appropriate Common Article 3 agreements 
had been concluded. It did, however, envisage the possibility of such 
prosecution under Article 3 of the Statute.16 Implicitly, the Chamber decided 
that it was not possible to prosecute violations of Common Article 3 under the 
grave breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions. The relatively cautious 
approach to interpretation of Article 2 of the ICTY Statute taken by the 
majority can be contrasted with a much more progressive approach adopted in 
a separate opinion by Judge Abi-Saab. He was of the view that the Tribunal 
should assume jurisdiction under Article 2 for acts committed in internal 
conflicts on the basis of either a new interpretation of the Geneva Conventions 
or the establishment of a new customary rule ancillary to the Conventions. 
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As a matter of treaty interpretation-and assuming that the traditional reading 
of "grave breaches" has been correct-it can be said that this new normative 
substance has led to a new interpretation of the Conventions as a result of the 
"subsequent practice" and opinio juris of the States parties: a teleological 
interpretation of the Conventions in the light of their object and purpose of the 
effect of including internal conflicts within the regime of "grave breaches." The 
other possible rendering of the significance of the new normative substance is to 
consider it as establishing a new customary rule ancillary to the Conventions, 
whereby the regime of "grave breaches" is extended to internal conflicts. But the 
first seems to me as the better approach. And under either, Article 2 of the 
Statute applies-the same as Article 3, 4 and 5-in both international and 
internal conflictsP 
The majority judgment in the Tadiclurisdiction Decision set the standard for 
consideration of the conflict classification issue by the Trial Chambers. 
The major decisions at the trial chamber level addressing the classification 
issue to date have been the Rule 61 proceeding18 concerning Ivica Rajic19 and 
the Tadic Trial Decision. 2o These decisions have tended to focus on three 
related questions: (a) did an international conflict exist when the offenses were 
committed? (b) was the accused linked in an appropriate fashion tp one side of 
the international conflict? and (c) were the victims in the hands of a party to 
the conflict or occupying power of which they were not nationals? Most of the 
victims are civilians, and Article 4 of the Civilians Convention states in part: 
"Persons protected are those who ... find themselves ... in the hap-ds of a Party 
to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals." In the 
absence of any other relevant international decisions, and for better or worse, 
particular heed has been paid by the trial chambers to the Nicaragua decision of 
the International Court of Justice when considering conflict classification.21 
The Nicaragua decision was concerned with State responsibility for violations 
of international humanitarian law, not with individual criminal responsibility. 
Further, it was concerned with the peculiar facts of the 
"contra" struggle in Nicaragua, and these facts are not necessarily similar to the 
facts arising in the territory of the former Yugoslavja. 
In the Rajic Rule 61 proceeding, a trial consisting of Judges 
McDonald, Sidhwa, and Vohrah reviewed and reconfirmed an indictment 
against Ivica Rajic alleging that Bosnian Croat forces under his command 
attacked the Bosnian village ofStupni Do on 23 October 1993 and committed 
several offenses for which Rajic was responsible, including the grave breach of 
wilful killing recognized by Article 2(a) of the ICTY Statute. Bearing in mind 
the Tadic lurisdiction Decision, the trial chamber was of the view that it was 
" 
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necessary to establish an undefined quantum of third,State (Croatian) 
involvement in the clashes between Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat 
(HVO) forces to convert an internal conflict into an international conflict. The 
prosecution advanced two theories: (a) the conflict was international because 
of the direct military involvement of Croatian forces engaged in combat with 
Bosnian forces in Bosnia; and (b) the conflict was international because, in the 
hostilities between Bosnia and the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian Croats were 
closely related to and controlled by Croatia and its armed forces. In brief: 
13. The Chamber finds that, for purposes of the application of the grave 
breaches prOVisions of Geneva Convention IV, the significant and continuous 
military action by the armed forces of Croatia in support of the Bosnian Croats 
against the forces of the Bosnian Government on the territory of the latter was 
sufficient to convert the domestic conflict between the Bosnian Croats and the 
Bosnian Government into an international one. The evidence submitted by the 
Prosecutor provides reasonable grounds to believe that between 5,000 to 7,000 
members of the Croatian Army as well as some members of the Croatian Armed 
Forces ("HOS"), were present in the territory of Bosnia and were involved, both 
directly and through their relations with HB and the HVO, in clashes with 
Bosnian Government forces in central and southern Bosnia. 
The Chamber indicated, however, that the existence of an international 
conflict between Bosnia and Croatia during the appropriate period was not 
enough, by itself, to establish that grave breaches had been committed by 
Bosnian Croats. It was also essential to establish that Croatia exerted such 
political and military control over the Bosnian Croats that the latter might be 
regarded as an agent or extension of Croatia. The Chamber addressed the issue 
as follows: 
25. The Trial Chamber deems it necessary to emphasise that the 
International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case considered the issue of 
agency in a very different context from the one before the Trial Chamber in this 
case. First, the Court's decision in the Nicaragua case was a final determination of 
the United States' responsibility for the acts of the contras. In contrast, the 
instant proceedings are preliminary in nature and may be revised a t trial. Second, 
in the Nicaragua case the Court was charged with determining State 
. responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law. It therefore 
rightly focused on the United States' operational control over the contras, 
holding that the "general control by the [United States] over a force with a high 
degree of dependency on [the United States]" was not sufficient to establish 
liability for violations by that force. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 11 115. In 
contrast, this Chamber is not called upon to determine Croatia's liability for the 
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acts of the Bosnian Croats. Rather, it is required to decide whether the Bosnian 
Croats can be regarded as agents of Croatia for establishing subject,matter 
jurisdiction over discrete acts which are alleged to be violations of the grave 
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Specific operational control is 
therefore not critical to the inquiry. Rather, the Trial Chamber focuses on the 
general political and military control exercised by Croatia over the Bosnian 
Croats. 
The Chamber then went on to determine whether the Bosnian civilian 
victims were protected persons in that they were in the hands of a party to the 
conflicts of which they were not nationals: 
37. The Chamber has been presented with considerable evidence that the 
Bosnian Croats controlled the territory surrounding the village ofStupni Do .... 
&:cause the Trial Chamber has already held that there are reasonable grounds 
for believing that Croatia controlled the Bosnian Croats, Croatia may be 
regarded as being in control of this area. Thus, although the residents ofStupni 
Do were not direcdy or physically "in the hands of" Croatia, they can be treated 
as being constructively "in the hands of' Croatia, a country of which they were 
not nationals. The Trial Chamber therefore finds that the civilian residents of 
the village ofStupni Do were-for the purposes of the grave breaches provisions 
of Geneva Convention IV-protected persons vis,iJ.,vis the Bosnian Croats 
because the latter were controlled by Croatia. 
The Tadie Trial Decision has the most elaborate discussion of the conflict 
classification issue to date. The Trial Chamber in this case consisted of} udges 
McDonald, Vohrah, and Stephen. As indicated earlier, Tadie is a Bosnian Serb 
who committed offences against Bosnian Muslims or Croats in Bosnia in the 
summer of 1992. In brief, the majority, consisting of Judges Vohrah and 
Stephen, held that the Geneva Conventions did apply in Bosnia throughout 
the period covered by the indictment, because of an ongoing international 
armed conflict between Bosnia and the SFRY/FRy.22 The majority then made 
two unsubstantiated assertions in a single paragraph: that (a) the armed forces 
of the Republika Srpska (the VRS) and the RS as a whole were, at least from 19 
May 1992 onwards, legal entities distinct from the FRY armed forces (VJ) and 
from the FRY, and (b) members of the VRS were nationals ofBosniaY May 19, 
1992 was significant as the date of the dissolution of the old SFRY national 
army (the JNA) into two new components, the VRS and the VJ, and the formal 
withdrawal of the VJ from Bosnia. This was in spite of the majority observation 
that: 
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115. The formal withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia and Herzegovina took 
place on 19 May 1992; the VRS was in effect a product of the dissolution of the 
old JNA and the withdrawal of its non' Bosnian elements into Serbia. However, 
most, if not all, of the commanding officers of units of the old JNA who found 
themselves stationed with their units in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 18 May 
1992, nearly all Serbs, remained in command of those units throughout 1992 and 
1993 and did not return to Serbia. This was so whether or not they were in fact in 
origin Bosnian Serbs. This applied also to most other officers and 
non' commissioned officers. Although then formally members of the VRS rather 
than of the former JNA, they continued to receive their salaries from the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
and the pensions of those who in due course retired were paid by that 
Government. At a briefing of officers concerned with logistics, General Dorde 
Dukic, then of the VRS but who had, until 18 May 1992, been Chief of Staff of 
the Technical Administration of the JNA in Belgrade, announced that all the 
active duty members of the VRS would continue to be paid by the federal 
government in Belgrade, which would continue to finance the VRS, as it had the 
JNA, with the same numerical strengths of officers as were registered on 19 May 
1992. The weapons and equipment with which the new VRS was armed were 
those that the units had had when part of the JNA. After 18 May 1992 supplies 
for the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to come from Serbia. 
Relying on its unanalyzed conclusions that the VRS and RS were legally 
distinct from the VJ and the FRY and that members of the VRS were Bosnian 
nationals, the majority went on to review the Nicaragua case in order to 
determine the proper rule for applying general principles of international law 
relating to State responsibility for de facto organs or agents to the specific 
circumstances of rebel forces fighting a seemingly internal conflict against the 
recognized government of a State, but dependent on the support of a foreign 
power in the continuation of that conflict. The majority noted that the ICJ had 
a set a particularly high standard for determining whether or not the United 
States was responsible for the activities of the contras. The central portion of 
the ICJ judgment on this point was quoted: 
585 .... United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the 
financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the 
selection ofits military or paramilitary targets and the planning of the whole of its 
operation, is still insufficient in itself, on the basis of the evidence in the 
possession of the Court, for the purposes of attributing to the United States the 
acts committed by the contras in the course of their military or paramilitary 
operations in Nicaragua .... For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the 
United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective 
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control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged 
violations were committed,24 
The majority identified two substantial differences between the facts of the 
Nicaragua case and the facts in the Tadic case: first, the VRS was an occupying 
force, not a raiding army,25 and second, the FRY clearly did control Bosnian 
Serb military activities until approximately 19 May 92.26 
588. Consequently, the Trial Chamber must consider the essence of the test 
of the relationship between a de facto organ or agent, as a rebel force, and its 
controlling entity or principal, as a foreign Power, namely the more general 
question whether, even if there had been a relationship of great dependency on 
the one side, there was such a relationship of control on the other that, on the 
facts of the instant case, the acts of the VRS, including its occupation of oplitina 
Prijedor, can be imputed to the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) .... 
In doing so it is neither necessary nor sufficient merely to show that the VRS 
was dependent, even completely dependent, on the V] and the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It must also be shown that the V] and 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exercised the 
potential for control inherent in that relationship of dependency or that the VRS 
had otherwise placed itself under the control of the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 
It was the position of the majority that the law applicable to State responsibility 
was also relevant to determining which body of law applied for individual 
criminal responsibility. In order to establish State responsibility, it was 
necessary to establish that the FRY exercised effective control over the VRS or 
the RS. Logistical support, personnel support, and common aims were 
insufficient. 
598. This leads the Trial Chamber to a consideration of two relationships of 
especial importance to the question which this Trial Chamber must determine. 
The first is the relationship of General Mladic, and hence the VRS Main Staff, to 
Belgrade .... The only evidence which the Prosecution was able to adduce as to 
the command and control relationship between the VRS Main Staff and 
Belgrade was that proVided by Colonel Selak. He said, speaking of a Prosecution 
exhibit displaying a link between the Main Staffs of the VRS and V] after 18 May 
1992 (Prosecution Exhibit 174): 
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[T)here was no real chain of command because officially the 
Commander of the army of the Republika Srpska was Colonel General 
Ratko Mladic. So this [link) is just pro forma because other relations 
between the Chief of Staff, the main staff of the Yugoslav Army and the 
main staff of the army of the Republika Srpska were not really existing but, 
in fact, they did co-ordinate. 
Coordination is not the same as command and control. The only other evidence 
submitted by the Prosecution was that, in addition to routing all high-level VRS 
communications through secure links in Belgrade, a communications link for 
everyday use was established and maintained between VRS Main Staff 
Headquarters and the VJ Main Staff in Belgrade. No further evidence was 
offered by the Prosecution on the nature of this relationship. 
599. What then of the second relationship, namely that between the SDS 
(and hence the Republika Srpska) and the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)? Unlike the situation confronted by the 
Court in the Nicaragua case, where the United States had largely selected and 
installed the political leaders of the contras, in the Republika Srpska political 
leaders were popularly elected by the Bosnian Serb people of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indeed, as previously noted, the independence of the 
Republika Srpska itself was declared at a vote of the Assembly of the Serbian 
People of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 9 January 1992. The Assembly and its 
leaders played a role in the overall conduct of the war both in the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and beyond, in addition to the supply of paramilitary 
forces to supplement the fighting strength of the new VRS units, which forces 
took part in the military operations in opstina Prijedor .... 
605. Thus, while it can be said that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro), through the dependence of the VRS on the supply of 
materiel by the Vj, had the capability to exercise great influence and perhaps 
even control over the VRS, there is no evidence on which this Trial Chamber 
can conclude that the Federal Republic of YugoslaVia (Serbia and Montenegro) 
and the VJ ever directed or, for that matter, ever felt the need to attempt to 
direct, the actual military operations of the VRS, or to influence those operations 
beyond that which would have flowed naturally from the coordination of military 
objectives and activities by the VRS and VJ at the highest levels. In sum, while, 
as in the Nicaragua case, the evidence available to this Trial Chamber clearly 
shows that the "various forms of assistance prOVided" to the armed forces of the 
Republika Srpska by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) was "crucial to the pursuit of their activities" and, as 
with the early years of the contras' activities, those forces were almost completely 
dependent on the supplies of the VJ to carry out offensive operations, evidence 
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that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) through the 
V] "made use of the potential for control inherent in that dependence," or was 
othenvise given effective control over those forces and which it exercised, is 
similarly insufficient. 
On the basis of its assessment of the law as contained in the Nicaragua 
decision (the effective control test) and its assessment of the facts, the majority 
found that the VRS and the RS could not be regarded as de facto organs or 
agents of the FRY. As a consequence, the civilian victims in the Tadic case 
could not be regarded as protected persons within the meaning of the Geneva 
Civilians Convention, because they were not in the hands of a party, of which 
they were not nationals, to an armed conflict. The Bosnian victims were in the 
hands of their Bosnian (Serb) fellow nationals. As a consequence, the grave 
breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions recognized in Article 2 of the 
ICTY Statute did not apply. 27 
Judge McDonald, continuing to adopt the approach she had formulated in 
the Rajic Rule 61 Proceeding, filed a robust dissent in which she argued that the 
majority had misinterpreted the Nicaragua decision and in any event had 
misapplied its mistaken interpretation to the facts. In her view, Nicaragua 
established two distinct tests for attributatility: effective control and agency. 
She summarized her analysis as follows: 
25. The separate opinion ofjudge Ago [in the Nicaragua case], also cited by 
the majority, explains with lucidity the concept that a State can be found legally 
responsible even where there is no finding of agency. He states: 
[Tlhe negative answer returned by the Court to the Applicant's suggestion 
that the misdeeds committed by some members of the contra forces should 
be considered as acts imputable to the United States of America is likewise 
in conformity with the provisions of the International Law Commission's 
draft. It would indeed be inconsistent with the principles governing the 
question to regard members of the contra forces as persons or groups acting 
in the name and on behalf of the United States of America. Only in cases 
where certain members of those forces happened to have been specifically 
charged by United States authorities to commit a particular act, or to carry 
out a particular task of some kind on behalf of the United States, would it 
be possible so to regard them. Only in such instances does international 
law recognize, as a rare exception to the rule, that the conduct of persons or 
groups which are neither agents nor organs of a State, nor members of its 
apparatus even in the broadest acceptation of that Lenn, may be held to be acts of 
that State. The Judgment, accordingly, takes a correct view when, referring 
in particular to the atrocities, acts of violence or terrorism and other 
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inhuman actions that Nicaragua alleges to have been committed by the 
contras against the persons and property of civilian populations, it holds 
that the perpetrators of these misdeeds may not be considered as having 
been specifically charged by United States authorities to commit them 
unless, in certain concrete cases, unchallengeable proof to the contrary has 
been supplied.28 
Therefore it appears that there are two bases on which the acts of the VRS could 
be attributed to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro): 
where the VRS acted as an agent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia 
and Montenegro), which could be established by a finding of dependency on the 
one side and control on the other; or where the VRS was specifically charged by 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to carry out a 
particular act on behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) thereby making the act itself attributable to the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In Nicaragua, the court required a 
showing of effective control for this latter determination. 
If "effective control" is the proper test, Judge McDonald, interpreting the 
same evidence and accepting the same facts, concluded that the FRY did 
effectively control the VRS, that the creation of the VRS was a legal fiction, and 
that the attack which provided the opportunity for T adic to commit offenses 
had to have been planned before the VRS was created on 19 May 1992. 
7. The evidence proves that the creation of the VRS was a legal fiction. The 
only changes made after the 15 May 1992 Security Council resolution were the 
transfer of troops, the establishment of a Main Staff of the VRS, a change in the 
name of the military organisation and individual units, and a change in the 
insignia. There remained the same weapons, the same equipment, the same 
officers, the same commanders, largely the same troops, the same logistics 
centres, the same suppliers, the same infrastructure, the same source of 
payments, the same goals and mission, the same tactics, and the same operations. 
Importantly, the objective remained the same: to create an ethnically pure Serb 
State by uniting Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and extending that State from 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the Croatian 
Krajina along the important logistics and supply line that went through opstina 
Prijedor, thereby necessitating the expulsion of the non-Serb population of the 
opstina. 
8. Although there is little evidence that the VRS was formally under the 
command of Belgrade after 19 May 1992, the VRS clearly continued to operate 
as an integrated and instrumental part of the Serbian war effort. This finding is 
supported by evidence that every VRS unit had been a unit in the JNA, the 
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command and staffs remaining virtually the same after the re-designation. The 
VRS Main Staff, the members of which had all been generals in the JNA and 
many of whom were appointed to their positions by the JNA General Staff, 
maintained direct communications with the VJ General Staff via a 
communications link from Belgrade .... The ties between the military in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the SDS political party, which advocated a Greater Serbia, 
similarly remained unchanged after the re-designation. 
9. In addition, the evidence establishes that the VRS, in continuing the JNA 
operation to take over oplitina Prijedor, executed the military operation for the 
benefit of the Federal of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 
The prosecution has appealed the Trial Chamber decision in T adic, arguing: 
• The Trial Chamber erred in relying upon the Nicaragua case and the 
"effective control" test to determine the applicability of the grave breach 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions. 
• The provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the relevant principles. 
and authorities of international humanitarian law only require that the 
perpetrator: be demonstrably linked to a party to an international armed 
conflict of which the victim is not a national, for the grave breach provisions to 
be rendered applicable. 
• Assuming the Nicaragua case is to be. relied upon, the decision in the 
Nicaragua case also applied an "agency" test, which is a more appropriate 
standard for determining the applicability of the grave breach provisions. 
• In any event, assuming that the "effective control" test mentioned in the 
Nicaragua case is applicable to determining the applicability of grave breach 
provisions, the Trial Chamber erred in finding that this test is not satisfied on 
the facts of this case, which also satisfy the "agency" test outlined in the 
Nicaragua case.29 
The main argument advanced by the prosecution is that the Nicaragua case 
is not relevant to the determination of the applicablity of the grave breach 
provisions or to determining individual criminal responsibility. It is essential to 
establish the existence of an international armed' conflict in Bosnia at the time 
when Tadic is alleged to have committed his crimes. It is then necessary to 
establish that the perpetrator (Tadic) has a demonstrable link to one party to 
the international armed conflict while the victim is linked to a neutral or to a 
party on the other side. Further, as an aside, although Article 4 of the Civilians 
Convention defines "protected persons" as persons in the hands of a party of 
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which they are not nationals, determination of nationality is not a simple 
process when States are in the process of decomposition. A simplistic 
assumption that persons must be nationals of a new State simply because they 
live in its territory at the moment of creation is inappropriate.3o 
Violations of the Laws or Customs of War 
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute gives the Tribunal power to prosecute persons 
violating the laws or customs of war. Certain violations are enumerated in the 
article, but the list is In the T adic Jurisdiction Decision, the Appeals 
Chamber considered the meaning of the expression "violation of the laws or 
customs of war" in the ICTY Statute. Its assessment may have an impact 
outside the Tribunal. The defense argued that Article 3 applied exclusively to 
international conflicts.3 ! The prosecution argued that the expression "laws or 
customs of war" was at one time viewed as a term of art referring to laws or 
customs applicable exclusively to declared wars. As declared wars became 
uncommon, the expression was viewed as a term of art applicable to all 
international armed conflicts. In the opinion of the prosecution, with the 
development of treaty law specifically intended to apply to 
armed conflicts, and of customary law applicable to armed 
conflicts, the expression "laws or customs of war" had become a term of art 
which applies to all armed conflicts, although it does not bear the same content 
in international and conflicts. The prosecution also argued 
that Article 3 enabled the Tribunal to prosecute all violations of applicable 
international humanitarian law treaties. Specifically, with reference to the 
Tadic case, the prosecution argued that the ICTY had the power to prosecute 
for violations of the rules in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
committed in international or internal conflicts.32 
Although the Appeals Chamber utilized a relatively conservative approach 
with respect to Article 2, it adopted an extremely progressive and creative 
approach concerning Article 3 of the Statute. The Chamber adopted the 
approach favored by the prosecution and went on at some length to elaborate 
upon its implications and upon the content of the relevant customary law, 
particularly that part of customary law which, in its view, applies to all armed 
conflicts regardless of classification. It is reasonable to assume that the 
Chamber focused its analysis on this part of customary law, both because it 
shared the view it apparently assigned to the Security Council that the conflicts 
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia are many and of mixed character, and 
because the content of this part of customary law had not been reviewed by a 
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tribunal in the past. In paragraph 94 of the Jurisdiction Decision, the Appeals 
Chamber set forth the requirements for an offense to be subject to prosecution 
under Article 3 of the Statute: 
• The violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of international 
humanitarian law. 
• The rule must be customary in nature, or if it belongs to treaty law, the 
required conditions must be met. 
• The violations must be "serious," that is to say, it must constitute a breach 
of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must involve grave 
consequences for the victim. Thus, for instance, the fact of a combatant simply 
appropriating a loaf of bread in an occupied village would not amount to a 
"serious violation of international humanitarian law," although it may be 
regarded as falling afoul of the basic principle laid down in Article 46, 
paragraph 1, of the Hague Regulations (and the corresponding rule of 
customary international law) whereby "private property must be respected" by 
any army occupying an enemy territory. 
• The violation of the rule must entail, under customary or conventional 
law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule. 
It follows that it does not matter whether the "serious violation" has occurred 
within the context of an international or an internal armed conflict, as long as 
the requirements set out above are met. 
The Chamber regarded Article 3 of the Statute as a general or residual 
clause covering all violations of humanitarian law not falling within Articles 2, 
4, or 5. In so doing, it did not avoid or evade the classification issue. 
Classification remains relevant (a) when the sole source of a rule is a treaty 
which applies to a specific type of conflict (Protocol I, the Geneva Conventions 
and the Hague Conventions apply to international conflicts. Protocol II applies 
to internal conflicts.), or (b), when the customary law applies to a specific type 
of conflict. 
Concerning treaty provisions, other than the grave breach provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions, the Chamber indicated it has jurisdiction to punish 
under Section 3 of the Statute: 
143. Before both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber, Defence and 
Prosecution have argued the application of certain agreements entered into by 
the conflicting parties. It is therefore fitting for this Chamber to pronounce on 
this. It should be emphasised again that the only reason behind the stated 
purpose of the drafters that the International Tribunal should apply customary 
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international law was to avoid violating the principle of nuUum crimen sine lege in 
the event that a party to the conflict did not adhere to a specific treaty. (Report 
of the Secretary-General, at para. 34). It follows that the International Tribunal 
is authorised to apply, in addition to customary international law, any treaty 
which: (i) was unquestionably binding on the parties at the time of the alleged 
offence; and (ii) was not in conflict with or derogated from peremptory norms of 
international law, as are most customary rules of international humanitarian law. 
Although the Chamber has adopted a very progressive approach concerning 
the content of customary law applicable to internal conflict, it did not state 
that customary law is identical for all conflicts. In particular, it held: 
126. The emergence of the aforementioned general rules on internal 
conflicts does not imply that internal strife is regulated by general international 
law in all its aspects. Two particular limitations may be noted: (i) only a number 
of rules and principles governing international armed conflicts have gradually 
been extended to apply to internal conflicts; and (ii) this extension has not taken 
place in the form of a full and mechanical transplant of those rules to internal 
conflicts; rather the general essence of those rules and not the detailed 
regulation they may contain has become applicable to internal conflicts. 
The decision therefore, envisages charges under Article 3 of the Statute: (a) 
where an armed conflict must be established but classification is irrelevant 
because the basis for the charge is a rule of customary law which applies to all 
armed conflicts; (b) where an armed conflict must be established and classified 
as international because the basis for the charge is a rule of treaty or customary 
law which applies exclusively to international conflicts; or (c) where an armed 
conflict must be established and classified as internal because the basis for the 
charge is a rule of treaty or customary law which applies exclusively to internal 
conflicts. 
As a general statement, evidenced by practice before the International 
Court of Justice, proof that a rule is a part of customary law is an extremely 
difficult task.33 The Appeals Chamber has, however, provided a relatively 
elaborate discussion of the current content of customary law. In particular, it 
has indicated that the following rules apply to all conflicts regardless of 
classifica tion: 
• The rules in Common Article 3 (para 102); 




• The principles in UN General Assembly Resolution 2675 (paras. 111 and 
112). . 
In addition to elaborating upon the content of customary law applicable to 
all conflicts and also to internal conflicts, the Chamber countered a defense 
assertion that the law applicable to internal armed conflicts did not entail 
individual criminal responsibility. Indeed, neither Additional Protocol II nor 
Common Article 3 contain provisions referring to criminal liability, although 
each of the Geneva Conventions does contain a relevant provision that states 
in part: "Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the 
suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present Convention 
other than the grave breaches."34 The Tribunal addressed the issue as follows: 
128 .... Faced with similar claims with respect to the various agreements and 
conventions that formed the basis of its jurisdiction, the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg concluded that a finding of individual criminal 
responsibility is not barred by the absence of treaty provisions on punishment of 
breaches. (See THE TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG GERMANY, 
Part 22, at 445,467 (1950)). The Nuremberg Tribunal considered a number of 
factors relevant to its conclusion that the authors of particular prohibitions incur 
individual responsibility: the clear and unequivocal recognition of the rules of 
warfare in international law and State practice indicating an intention to 
criminalize the prohibition, including statements by governments officials and 
international organizations, as well as punishment of violations by national 
courts and military tribunals (id., at 445-47,467). Where these conditions are 
met, individuals must be held criminally responsible, because, as the Nuremberg 
Tribunal concluded: 
"[clrimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can 
the provisions of international law be enforced." (Id., at 447). 
129. Applying the foregoing criteria to the violations at issue here, we have 
no doubt that they entail individual criminal responsibility, regardless of whether 
they are committed in internal or international armed conflicts. Principles and 
rules of humanitarian law reflect "elementary considerations of humanity" 
Widely recognized as the mandatory minimum for conduct in armed conflicts of 
any kind. No one can doubt the gravity of the acts at issue, nor the interest of the 
international community in their prohibition. 
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130. Furthermore, many elements of international practice show that States 
intend to criminalize serious breaches of customary rules and principles on 
internal conflict. 
The Chamber's interpretation of the scope of customary law embraced by 
the expression "violations of the laws or customs of war" is indeed quite 
progressive. Reputable authorities have been of the view that no customary law 
exists for internal conflict!5 and that there is no basis for an assignment of 
criminal responsibility for acts occurring in internal conflicts except by a 
domestic court in the State where the conflict occurred.36 Further, the basis for 
the conclusion that a body of customary law applicable to all conflicts exists 
might also be subjected to criticism. Extracts from the oral argument of the 
United States in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion case highlight the 
distinction between the approach of the Tribunal and the more traditional 
approach: 
It is a fundamental principle of international law that restnctlons on 
States-particularly those affecting the conduct of armed conflict-cannot be 
presumed; they must, rather, be found in conventional law specifically accepted 
by States, or in customary law generally accepted as such by the community of 
nations. The Court made this vital point in the case of Nicaragua v. United 
(I.e.]. Reports 1986, p.135), recalling that 
in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be 
accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level 
of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited. 
An even higher standard applies in establishing the existence of 
peremptory norms of international law, which must be accepted and 
recognized by the international community as norms from which no 
derogation is permitted .... 37 
As the Court has clearly established, customary international law is created by a 
general and consistent practice of States, followed out of a sense of legal 
obligation. The Court has noted in the North Sea Continental Shelf case that the 
incorporation of a norm into customary international law requires "extensive 
and virtually uniform" State practice.38 
As a matter of law, the General Assembly's resolutions could only be 
declarative of principles of customary international law to the extent that such 




When contrasted with the rigorous approach adopted by the International 
Court of Justice and other tribunals towards proof of customary law in other 
areas of international law, the substantiation provided by the Appeals 
Chamber for its conclusions concerning customary law is limited. The support 
for the conclusion that a certain common body of customary law applied to 
both international and internal conflicts consists primarily of two UN General 
Assembly Resolutions, 2444 of 19 December 1968 and 2675 of 9 December 
1970, and a quotation from the Nicaragua decision.4o Support for the 
conclusion that there is a significant body of customary law applicable to 
internal conflicts is more firmly based, consisting of examples from the Spanish 
Civil War of 1936-1939 (para. 100), the Chinese civil war that ended in 1949 
(para. 102), the Nicaragua contra struggles of the 1980s (para. 103), the 1967 
conflict in Yemen (para. 105), the Congo civil war of the 1960s (para. 106), the 
1980s conflict in EI Salvador (para. 107), and various declarations by States 
and international organizations urging States involved in internal conflicts to 
comply with certain minimum standards. 
It must, however, be conceded that tribunals which have addressed the issue 
of the customary law content of international humanitarian law have tended to 
avoid detailed proofs. The International Military Tribunal at N uremberg,41 the 
tribunal which decided the High Command Case,42 and even the Ie] itself in the 
Nicaragua Case43 have all tended to reach essentially unsubstantiated 
conclusions on these matters. In the words ofTheodor Meron: 
Only a few international judicial decisions discuss the customary law nature of 
international humanitarian law instruments. These decisions nevertheless point 
to certain trends in this area, including a tendency to ignore, for the most part, 
the availability of evidence of state practice (scant as it may have been) and to 
assume that noble humanitarian principles that deserve recognition as the 
positive law of the international community have in fact been recognized as such 
by states. The "ought" merges with the "is," the lex ferenda with the lex lata. The 
teleological desire to solidify the humanizing content of the humanitarian norms 
clearly affects the judicial attitudes underlying the "legislative" character of the 
judicial process. Given the scarcity of actual practice, it may well be that, in 
reality, tribunals have been guided, and are likely to continue to be gUided, by the 
degree of offensiveness of certain acts to human dignity; the more heinous the 
act, the more the tribunal will assume that it violates not only a moral principle of 
humanity but also a positive norm of customary law.44 
Indeed, the Appeals Chamber, in the Jurisdiction Decision, has provided the 
most sophisticated and rigorous judicial determination to date of the 
customary law aspects of international humanitarian law. One might hope, 
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however, that the ICTY will return to some of these issues in future to 
strengthen their legal foundations. 
Crimes against Humanity 
In contrast to both the relatively conservative approach taken concerning 
Article 2 of the Statute and the somewhat progressive approach taken 
concerning Article 3, in the Tadic Jurisdiction Decision the Appeals Chamber 
adopted a relatively approach concerning the 
interpretation of Article 5 with respect to crimes against humanity. The 
approach taken in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg45 and in the judgment of the International Military Tribunal 
{IMT)46 was to link crimes against humanity to other offenses within the 
jurisdiction of the IMT and, in particular, to link crimes against humanity to the 
existence of an international armed conflict. On the other hand, Control 
Council Law No. 10,47 which provided the basis for several subsequent trials at 
Nuremberg by American tribunals, defined crimes against humanity but did 
not restrict the jurisdiction of tribunals empowered under it to offenses 
committed "in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal."48 As a result, the tribunals in some of the 
subsequent proceedings regarded crimes against humanity as offenses which 
need not have a link with international armed conflict.49 
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute gave the Tribunal the power to prosecute 
persons committing crimes against humanity "when committed in armed 
conflict." The defense argued that insofar as Article 5 purported to regulate 
conduct in internal conflict it offended against the nullum crimen principle, 
because in customary law crimes against humanity require a nexus with 
international armed conflict.5o The prosecution responded that under existing 
customary law, crimes against humanity did not require a nexus with any form 
of armed conflict and that as a result, since Article 5 adopted an approach that 
was more restrictive than customary law, it did not breach the nullurn crimen 
principle.51 The Tribunal decided (para. 141), "It is by now a settled rule of 
customary international law that crimes against humanity do not require a 
connection to international armed conflict." It went on to indicate the 
prosecution argument may well have been correct, and in any event Article 5 
was in compliance with the nullurn crimen principle. 
The Trial Chamber in the Tadic Trial Decision devoted substantial space to 
consideration of crimes against humanity. Article 5 of the ICTY Statute gives 
the Tribunal the power to prosecute persons responsible for crimes against 
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humanity "when committed in armed conflict" and "directed against any 
civilian population." The Trial Chamber accepted the test set out by the 
Appeals Chamber in the Taclie Jurisdiction Decision for the existence of an 
armed conflict: "[A] n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed 
force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a 
State." Finding the existence of an armed conflict (para. 628), it then 
considered the nexus between the act or omission and the armed conflict. The 
prosecution position-that the nexus was that the act must occur during the 
course of an armed conflict-was accepted, but the Chamber added two 
caveats: the act must be linked geographically as well as temporally with the 
armed conflict, and the act must not be unrelated to the armed conflict, i.e., it 
must not be done for purely personal motives of the perpetrator (paras. 633, 
634). Concerning "directed against any civilian population," the Chamber held 
that "any" made it clear that crimes against humanity could also be committed 
against stateless persons or civilians of the same nationality as the perpetrator 
(para. 635). Further, "civilian" would clearly exclude combatants, but it would 
otherwise be given a very broad definition, including, for example, hospital 
patients and resistance fighters who had laid down their arms (paras. 639-43). 
The requirement that crimes against humanity be directed against a civilian 
"population" was construed as requiring not that the entire population of a 
State or territory be victimized, but that such crimes be of a collective nature, 
not single or isolated acts (para. 644). The prosecution argued that the term 
"population" in Article 5 implied that the accused must participate in a 
widespread or systematic attack against a relatively large victim group. The 
defense position was that violations must be both widespread and systematic. 
The Chamber accepted the prosecution approach: 
648. It is therefore the desire to exclude isolated or random acts from the 
notion of crimes against humanity that led to the inclusion of the requirement 
that the acts must be directed against a civilian "population," and either a finding 
of widespreadness, which refers to the number of victims, or systematicity, 
indicating that a pattern or methodical plan is eVident, fulfils this requirement. 
The Chamber went on to consider whether or not single acts could 
constitute crimes against humanity: 
649. A related issue is whether a single act by a perpetrator can constitute a 
crime against humanity. A tangential issue, not at issue before this Trial 
Chamber, is whether a single act in and of itself can constitute a crime against 
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humanity. This issue has been the subject of intense debate, with the 
jurisprudence immediately following the Second World War being mixed. The 
American tribunals generally supported the proposition that a massive nature 
was required, while the tribunals in the British Zone came to the opposite 
conclusion, finding that the mass element was not essential to the definition, in 
respect of either the number of acts or the number of victims and that "what 
counted wal> not the mass aspect, but the link between the act and the cruel and 
barbarous political system, specifically, the Nazi regime." Clearly, a single act by a 
perpetrator taken within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against 
a civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility and an individual 
perpetrator need not commit numerous offences to be held liable. Although it is 
correct that isolated, random acts should not be included in the definition of 
crimes against humanity, that is the purpose of requiring that the acts be directed 
against a civilian population and thus "[elven an isolated act can constitute a 
crime against humanity if it is the product of a political system based on terror or 
persecution." 
Although the Statute did not address the issue, the Chamber turned next to 
the issue of whether a discriminatory intent was a requirement for all crimes 
against humanity and not only for persecution under Article 5(h). No such 
requirement was contained in the Nuremberg Charter, Control Council Law 
No. 10, or the Tokyo Charter. Nevertheless, the Chamber imposed such a 
requirement in its interpretation of the Statute. 
652. Additionally this requirement is not contained in the Article on crimes 
against humanity in the I.L.C. Draft Code nor does the Defence challenge its 
exclusion in the Prosecution's definition of the offence. Significantly, 
discriminatory intent as an additional requirement for all crimes against 
humanity was not included in the Statute of this International Tribunal as it was 
in the Statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the latter of which has, 
on this point, recently been criticised. Nevertheless, because the requirement of 
discriminatory intent on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds for 
all crimes against humanity was included in the Report of the Secretary-General, 
and since several Security Council members stated that they interpreted Article 
5 as referring to acts taken on a discriminatory basis, the Trial Chamber adopts 
the requirement of discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity under 
Article 5. 
The Chamber then addressed what has been referred to as the "policy 
element." Crimes against humanity involve a deliberate policy made by an 
entity to target a civilian population. 
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653 .... Traditionally this requirement was understood to mean that there must 
be some form of policy to commit these acts. As explained by the Netherlands 
Hoge Raad in Public Prosecutor II. Menten: 
The concept of "crimes against humanity" also requires-although this is 
not expressed in so many words in the above definition [Article 6 (c) of the 
Niirnberg Charter]-that the crimes in question form a part of a system 
based on terror or constitute a link in a consciously pursued policy directed 
against particular groups of people. 
Importantly, however, such a policy need not be formalized and can be deduced 
from the way in which the acts occur. Notably, if the acts occur on a Widespread 
or systematic basis that demonstrates a policy to commit those acts, whether 
formalized or not. 
Further, it decided that the policy could be determined by actors as 
well as by States. 
654. An additional issue concerns the nature of the entity behind the policy. 
The traditional conception was, in fact, not only that a policy must be present 
but that the policy must be that of a State, as was the case in Nazi Germany. The 
prevailing opinion was, as_explained by one commentator, that crimes against 
humanity, as crimes of a collective nature, require a State policy "because their 
commission requires the use of the state's institutions, personnel and resources in 
order to commit, or refrain from preventing the commission of, the specified 
crimes described in Article 6(c) [of the Niirnberg Charter]." While this may 
have been the case during the Second World War, and thus the jurisprudence 
followed by courts adjudicating charges of crimes against humanity based on 
events alleged to have occurred during this period, this is no longer the case. As 
the first international tribunal to consider charges of crimes against humanity 
alleged to have occurred after the Second World War, the International 
Tribunal is not bound by past doctrine but must apply customary international 
law as it stood at the time of the offences. In this regard the law in relation to 
crimes against humanity has developed to take into account forces which, 
although not those of the legitimate government, have de facto control over, or 
are able to move freely within, defined territory. The Prosecution in its 
brief argues that under international law crimes against humanity can be 
committed on behalf of entities exercising de facto control over a particular 
territory but without international recognition or formal status of a de jure State, 
or by a terrorist group or organization. The Defence does not challenge this 
assertion, which conforms with recent statements regarding crimes against 
humanity. 
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Finally, the Chamber considered the intent necessary for crimes against 
humanity and concluded: 
659. Thus if the perpetrator has knowledge, either actual or constructive, 
that these acts were occurring on a widespread or systematic basis and does not 
commit his act for purely personal motives completely unrelated to the attack on 
the civilian population, that is sufficient to hold him liable for crimes against 
humanity. Therefore the perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the 
civilian population, know that his act fits in with the attack and the act must not 
be taken for purely personal reasons unrelated to the armed conflict. 
The prosecution is at present appealing two of the findings of the Trial 
Chamber on the law applicable to the ICTY related to crimes against humanity. 
With reference to the finding that crimes against humanity cannot be 
committed for purely personal motives, the prosecution argues that the motive 
for committing crimes against humanity is irrelevant.52 With reference to the 
finding that all crimes against humanity require a discriminatory intent, the 
prosecution argues that the ICTY Statute includes no such requirement, that 
customary law does not require a discriminatory intent for all crimes against 
humanity, and that Article 5 of the ICTY Statute is intended to reflect 
customary law.53 
Individual Criminal Responsibility 
Article 7 of the ICfY Statute addresses individual criminal responsibility. 
Article 7 (1) of the Statute provides, in part: "A person who planned, 
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, 
preparation or execution of a crime ... shall be individually responsible for the 
crime." 
Forms of Criminal Participation. The Tadic Trial Decision provides the first 
extended judicial consideration of this provision. It states: 
692. In sum, the accused will be found criminally culpable for any conduct 
where it is determined that he knowingly participated in the commission of an 
offence that violates international humanitarian law and his participation 
directly and substantially affected the commission of that offence through 
supporting the actual commission before, during, or after the incident. He will 




The Chamber elaborated on the meaning of "substantially": 
688 .... While there is no definition of "substantially," it is clear from the 
aforementioned cases that the substantial contribution requirement calls for a 
contribution that in fact has an effect on the commission of the crime. This is 
supported by the foregoing Niimberg cases where, in virtually every situation, 
the criminal act most probably would not have occurred in the same way had not 
someone acted in the role that the accused in fact assumed. For example, if there 
had been no poison gas or gas chambers in the Zyklon B cases, mass 
exterminations would not have been carried out in the same manner. The same 
analysis applies to the cases where the men were prosecuted for providing lists of 
names to German authorities. Even in these cases, where the act in complicity 
was significantly removed from the ultimate illegal result, it was clear that the 
actions of the accused had a substantial and direct effect on the commission of 
the illegal act, and that they generally had knowledge of the likely effect of their 
actions. 
It defined "aiding and abetting" as follows: 
689. The Trial Chamber finds that aiding and abetting includes all acts of 
assistance by words or acts that lend encouragement or support, as long as the 
requisite intent is present. Under this theory, presence alone is not sufficient if it 
is an ignorant or unwilling presence. However, if the presence can be shown or 
inferred, by circumstantial or other evidence, to be knowing and to have a direct 
and substantial effect on the commission of the illegal act, then it is sufficient on 
which to base a finding of participation and assign the criminal culpability that 
accompanies it. 
The Chamber also discussed the significance of physical presence during the 
commission of an offense: 
690. Moreover, when an accused is present and participates in the beating of 
one person and remains with the group when it moves on to beat another person, 
his presence would have an encouraging effect, even if he does not physically 
take part in this second beating, and he should be viewed as participating in this 
second beating as well. This is assuming that the accused has not actively 
withdrawn from the group or spoken out against the conduct of the group. 
691. However, actual physical presence when the crime is committed is not 
necessary; just as with the defendants who only drove victims to the woods to be 
killed, an accused can be considered to have participated in the commission of a 
crime based on the precedent of the Niimberg war crimes trials if he is found to 
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be "concerned with the killing." However, the acts of the accused must be direct 
and substantial. 
Command Responsibility. Article 7 (3) addresses command responsibility: 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute 
was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal 
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to 
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof. 
The scope of Article 7(3) has been addressed in two preliminary motions 
decided in the Blaskic case, one concerning the mens rea required for charges 
alleging command responsibility, and the other concerning whether or not the 
failure to punish provision in Article 7 (3) offended the nullum crimen principle. 
In the mens rea motion, the defense argued that the "knew or had reason to 
know" standard should be defined as: "(1) actual knowledge; or (2) wanton 
disregard of objective facts within the accused's actual possession compelling 
the conclusion that the accused's subordinates where about to commit or had 
committed the criminal acts alleged in the indictment."s4 
In response, the prosecution argued that a decision on mens rea at the 
pre' trial stage was premature, as the issue was too abstract in the absence of 
evidence to be considered at trial. If the issue was appropriate for consideration 
before the trial, the prosecution argued that a proper statement of the mens rea 
standard was: 
• Actual knowledge proved by direct evidence, or 
• Actual knowledge proved by circumstantial evidence, the "must have 
known" standard. The prosecution argued that the Tribunal should not 
reject the "must have known" mens rea standard because, although it may be 
conceptually similar to actual knowledge established by means of direct 
evidence, the evidentiary implications of knowledge inferred from 
circumstantial evidence are significantly different. In particular, where the 
crimes of subordinates are a matter of public notoriety, are numerous, or 
occur over a prolonged period or in a wide geographical area, there is a 
presumption that the commander had the requisite knowledge in the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, or 
• Wanton disregard not only of facts within his actual possession but also of 
facts that are not within his actual possession by reason of a failure on his part 
to supervise properly his subordinates and in particular to require and obtain 
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adequate reports or information and to be apprised of the actions of his 
subordinates. The appropriate mens rea standard under international law is 
wanton disregard of information of a general nature within the reasonable 
access of a commander indicating the likelihood of actual or prospective 
criminal conduct on the part of his subordinates.55 
The Trial Chamber rejected consideration of the substantive issues related to 
mens rea as premature but granted the accused permission to raise the issues 
again at tria1.56 
Concerning the defense motion alleging that the provision related to failure 
to punish liability offended the nullum crimen principle, the Chamber found 
"that the case law and the international conventions which enshrine the 
principle of the command responsibility of whoever fails to punish subordinates 
who have committed crimes are fullyadequate."57 
10. As regards international case-law, in the Tokyo trials, the Prime Minister 
ofjapan, Hideki TOjo, was found guilty by the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East on the follOWing grounds: 
(He) took no adequate steps to punish offenders (who ill-treated 
prisoners and internees) and to prevent the commission of similar offences 
in the future. ( ... ) He did not call for a report on the [Bataan death 
march). When in the Philippines in 1943 he made perfunctory inquiries 
about the march but took no action. No one was punished. ( ... ) Thus the 
head of the Government of Japan knowingly and wilfully refused to 
perform the duty which lay upon that Government of enforcing 
performance of the laws of war." [20 Tokyo Trials, 49845-49846). 
Although in its motion the Defence pleads that he "was found criminally 
responsible for both failure to prevent the recurrence of crimes and failure to 
punish; proof of both elements was required for criminal liability to attach" (p. 
21), the reasoning underlying that decision in no wayjustllies this argument. The 
decision clearly held Tojo responsible for having failed to punish his subordinates 
and thus emphasised that "No one was punished." That statement is based on 
the following reasoning: failing to punish subordinates ineVitably means failing to 
prevent the recurrence of crimes, whereas by punishing subordinates, such 
recurrence is naturally prevented, with the result that failure to punish alone is 
sufficient grounds for command responsibility. 
The Chamber also found support for its view in the Hostage Case (para. 11). 
As to treaty law basis for failure to punish liability, the chamber stated: 
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12. In respect of conventional law, it should be noted that the existence of 
such a principle of responsibility is also specified in the provisions of Protocol 1. A 
review of the official record of the Geneva diplomatic conference which adopted 
the Protocol shows that Articles 86 and 87 were adopted by consensus by the 
delegations of more than 90 States present at the 45th plenary meeting .... 
Thus Protocol I imposes, in Article 86 (2), penal or disciplinary responsibility 
on the part of superiors who did not take all practicable measures within their 
competence "to prevent or repress the offence" committed by their subordinates. 
As sanctioning the perpetrator of the crime is the effective means of repressing 
the offense, the Protocol further considers that an omission to punish constitutes 
a failure to comply with an obligation which engages command responsibility. 
And as Article 87(3) provides that the High Contracting Parties and the Parties 
to the conflict must demand of any commander that he implement the penal and 
disciplinary measures against the perpetrators of violations, it demonstrates even 
more clearly and specifically that, according to the Protocol, any failure to punish 
an offense is grounds for command responsibility. 
Potential Defenses 
Duress. Article 7 (4) of the ICTY Statute addresses the issue of superior orders: 
"The fact than an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government 
or of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal 
determines that justice so requires." Although the statutory provision ensures 
that superior orders, of themselves, will not constitute a defense, in most cases 
the issue of superior orders will be linked with duress, and neither the Statute 
nor the older case law adequately addresses duress as a potential defense. This 
poses a significant problem, because in general, duress may constitute a 
complete defense to all criminal charges in civil law systems, but it is not a 
defense to murder,type charges in common law systems. In the Erdenwvic Case, 
Drazen Erdemovic, a Bosnian Croat who was a member of a Bosnian Serb 
killing squad at Srebrenica which killed approximately 1,200 unarmed civilians 
and who personally killed between ten and a hundred persons, submitted a 
guilty plea to a crime against humanity charge. With his guilty plea, however, 
he also stated: 
Your Honour, I had to do this. If I had refused, I would have been killed together 
with the victims. When I refused, they told me: "If you're sorry for them, stand 
up, line up with them and we will kill you too." I am not sorry for myself but for 
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my family. my wife and son who then had nine months. and I could not refuse 
because then they would have killed me.53 
The Trial Chamber, composed entirely of judges from civil law 
systems-Jorda (France), Odio Benito (Costa Rica), and Riad (Egypt)-
accepted the guilty plea after devoting substantial heed to its validity in the 
judgment. Although the Chamber did not consider that a duress defense had 
been established in the case of Erdemovic, it also indicated that in certain 
carefully circumscribed circumstances duress could constitute a complete 
defense to a crime against humanity charge (paras. 13-21). 
Erdemovic appealed his sentence, and the duress issue was considered by 
the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals Chamber issued four separate opinions 
addressing duress and by a majority of three to two found that "duress does not 
afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against humanity 
and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings."59 Judge 
McDonald (USA) and Judge Vohrah (Malaysia) in a joint separate opinion, 
and Judge Li (China) in a separate and dissenting opinion held that duress was 
not a complete defense. Judge Cassese (Italy) and Judge Stephen (Australia) 
submitted separate dissenting opinions indicating that duress could constitute 
a complete defense in cases involving the killing of innocent persons, in limited 
circumstances. 
Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah found that no customary international 
law rule could be derived on the question of duress as a defense to the killing of 
innocent persons (paras. 46-55). They then reviewed a large, but not 
exhaustive, number of national systems in an attempt to determine whether 
there was an applicable general principle oflaw recognized by civilized nations. 
They concluded: "66 .... it is, in our view, a general principle oflaw recognized 
by civilized nations that an accused person is less blameworthy and less 
deserving of the full punishment when he performs a certain prohibited act 
under duress." On the other hand, "67. The rules of the various legal systems of 
the world are, however, largely inconsistent regarding the specific question 
whether duress affords a complete defence to a combatant charged with a war 
crime or a crime against humanity involving the killing of innocent persons." 
The two judges then went on to deny duress as a complete defense, on policy 
grounds. 
75. The resounding point from these eloquent passages is that the law should 
not be the product or slave of logic or intellectual hair-splitting. but must serve 
broader normative purposes in light of its social. political and economic role. It is 
noteworthy that the authorities we have just cited issued their cautionary words 
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in respect of domestic society and in respect of a range of ordinary crimes 
including kidnapping, assault, robbery and murder. Whilst reserving our 
comments on the appropriate rule for domestic national contexts, we cannot but 
stress that we are not, in the International Tribunal, concerned with ordinary 
domestic crimes. The purview of the International Tribunal relates to war crimes 
and crimes against humanity committed in armed conflicts of extreme violence 
with egregious dimensions. We are not concerned with the actions of domestic 
terrorists, gang,leaders and kidnappers. We are concerned that, in relation to the 
most heinous crimes known to humankind, the principles oflaw to which we give 
credence have the appropriate normative effect upon soldiers bearing weapons of 
destruction and upon the commanders who control them in armed conflict 
situations. The facts of this particular case, for example, involved the 
cold,blooded slaughter of 1,200 men and boys by soldiers using automatic 
weapons. We must bear in mind that we are operating in the realm of 
international humanitarian law which has, as one of its prime objectives, the 
protection of the weak and vulnerable in such a situation where their lives and 
security are endangered. Concerns about the harm which could arise from 
admitting duress as a defence to murder were suf6.cient to persuade a majority of 
the House of Lords and the Privy Council to categorically deny the defence in 
the national context to prevent the growth of domestic crime and the impunity 
of miscreants. Are they now insufficient to persuade us to similarly reject duress 
as a complete defence in our application of laws designed to take account of 
humanitarian concerns in the arena of brutal war, to punish perpetrators of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, and to deter the commission of such 
crimes in the future? If national law denies recognition of duress as a defence in 
respect of the killing of innocent persons, international criminal law can do no 
less than match that policy since it deals with murders often of far greater 
magnitude. If national law denies duress as a defence even in a case in which a 
single innocent life is extinguished due to action under duress, international law, 
in our view, cannot admit duress in cases which involve the slaughter of innocent 
human beings on a large scale. It must be our concern to facilitate the 
development and effectiveness of international humanitarian law and to 
promote its aims and application by recognising the normative effect which 
criminal law should have upon those subject to them. Indeed, Security Council 
Resolution 827 (1993) establishes the International Tribunal expressly as a 
measure to "halt and effectively redress" the widespread and flagrant violations 
of international humanitarian law occurring in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia and to contribute thereby to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace. 
They considered, but rejected, possible exceptions such as proportionality or 
cases where the victims would die regardless of the participation of the accused. 
Their preferred approach was to consider duress exclusively as a mitigating 
108 
William Fenrick 
factor during the sentencing phase. The rejection of duress as a complete 
defense was, however, applicable to soldiers alone: 
84. Secondly, as we have confined the scope of our inquiry to the question 
whether duress affords a complete defence to a soldier charged with killing 
innocent persons, we are of the view that soldiers or combatants are expected to 
exercise fortitude and a greater degree of resistance to a threat than civilians, at 
least when it is their own lives which are being threatened. Soldiers, by the very 
nature of their occupation, must have envisaged the possibility of violent death 
in pursuance of the cause for which they fight. The relevant question must 
therefore be framed in terms of what may be expected from the ordinary soldier 
in the situation of the Appellant. What is to be expected of such an ordinary 
soldier is not, by our approach, analysed in terms of a utilitarian approach 
involving the weighing up of harms. Rather, it is based on the proposition that it 
is unacceptable to allow a trained fighter, whose job necessarily entails the 
occupational hazard of dying, to avail himself of a complete defence to a crime in 
which he killed one or more innocent persons. 
Judge Li, in his separate dissenting opinion, adopted somewhat similar 
reasoning (paras. 5-12). Judge Cassese submitted a forceful dissenting 
opinion: 
11. I also respectfully disagree with the conclusions of the majority of the 
Appeals Chamber concerning duress, as set out in the Joint Separate Opinion 
of their Honours Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah and on the folloWing 
grounds: 
(i) after finding that no specific international rule has evolved on the question 
of whether duress affords a complete defence to the killing of innocent persons, 
the majority should have drawn the only conclusion imposed by law and logic, 
namely that the general rule on duress should apply-subject, of course, to the 
necessary requirements. In logic, if no exception to a general rule be proved, then 
the general rule prevails. Likewise in law, if one looks for a specific rule governing 
a specific aspect of a matter and concludes that no such rule has taken shape, the 
only inference to be drawn is that the specific aspects is regulated by the rule 
governing the general matter: 
(ii) instead of this simple conclusion, the majority of the Appeals Chamber 
has embarked upon a detailed investigation of "practical policy considerations" 
and has concluded by upholding "policy considerations" substantially based on 
English law. I submit that this examination is extraneous to the task of our Tribunal. 
This International Tribunal is called upon to apply international law, in 
particular our Statute and principles and rules ofinternational humanitarian law 
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and international criminal law. Our International Tribunal is a court oflaw; it is 
bound only by international law. It should therefore refrain from engaging in 
meta,legal analyses .... 
12. In short, I consider that: (1) under international criminal law duress may 
be generally urged as a defence, provided certain strict requirements are met; 
when it cannot be admitted as a defence, duress may nevertheless be acted upon 
as a mitigating circumstance: (2) with regard to war crimes or crimes against 
humanity whose underlying offence is murder or more generally the taking of 
human life, no special rule of customary international law has evolved on the 
matter; consequently, even with respect to these offences the general rule on 
duress applies; it follows that duress may amount to a defence provided that its 
stringent requirements are met .... 
The relevant case,law is almost unanimous in requiring four strict conditions 
to be met for duress to be upheld as a defence, namely: 
(i) the act charged was done under an immediate threat of severe and 
irreparable harm to life or limb; 
(ii) there was no adequate means of averting such evil; 
(iii) the crime committed was not disproportionate to the evil threatened 
(this would, for example, occur in case of killing in order to avert an assault). In 
other words, in order not to be disproportionate, the crime committed under 
duress must be, on balance, the lesser of two evils; 
(iv) the situation leading to duress must not have been voluntarily brought 
about by the person coerced. 
In addition, the relevant national legislation supports the principle that the 
existence in law of any special duty on the part of the accused towards the victim 
may preclude the possibility of raising duress as a defence. 
17. It is worth insisting on the fourth requirement just mentioned, in order to 
highlight its particular relevance to war,like situations. According to the 
case,law on international humanitarian law, duress or necessity cannot excuse 
from criminal responsibility the person who intends to avail himself of such 
defence if he freely and knowingly chose to become a member of a unit, 
organisation or group institutionally intent upon actions contrary to 
international humanitarian law. 
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Judge Stephen, in a separate and dissenting opinion, agreed with Judge Cassese 
and critized the rationale of the common law approach and the desirability of 
transferring it to the international arena (paras. 64-67). 
Reprisals. A reprisal is an illegal act resorted to after the other side in an armed 
conflict has committed unlawful acts and continues them after being called 
upon to cease. The reprisal is not a retaliatory act or a simple act of vengeance; 
it is a crude law,enforcement device. It must be roughly proportionate to the 
original wrongdoing, and it must be terminated as soon as the original 
wrongdoer ceases illegal actions.6o In certain circumstances, the defense of 
reprisal may be raised to charges for offenses within the jurisdiction of the 
ICTY. Reprisals against several categories of persons and objects are prohibited 
by the treaty law applicable to international armed conflict. In particular, 
reprisals are prohibited against civilians and civilian objects. For all practical 
purposes, the only legitimate reprisal targets international conflict are 
combatants and certain other military objectives. The treaty law of internal 
conflicts does not address the reprisal issue. UN General Assembly Resolution 
2675 indicates that reprisals against civilians are prohibited in all 
circumstances.61 
The question of the reprisal defense was litigated in the Rule 61 proceeding 
concerning Milan Marti in February 1996. The prosecution argued that the 
Chamber should decide that reprisals against civilians were prohibited in all 
conflicts, including internal conflicts, because (1) an explicit prohibition 
already existed in treaties applicable to international conflict; (2) UNGA 
Resolution 2675 reflects the state of customary law for all conflicts; (3) Article 
4 of Protocol II requiring protection of civilians "in all circumstances" 
implicitly prohibits reprisals; and (4) reprisals are an ineffective means of law 
enforcement.62 The Trial Chamber agreed: 
17. Therefore, the rule which states that reprisals against the civilian 
population as such, or individual civilians, are prohibited in all circumstances, 
even when confronted by wrongful behaViour of the other party, is an integral 
part of customary international law and must be respected in aU armed 
conflicts.63 
Future Developments 
The jurisprudence of the ICTY is a work in progress. The ICTY judges were 
initially elected for a four,year term that expired on 16 November 1997. Five of 
the sitting judges have been reelected, and six new judges have been elected, 
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commencing four,year terms on 17 November 1997. The duration of the lCTI' 
is uncertain and dependent on budgetary approval by the United Nations 
General Assembly. Certainly, there is enough work to keep the lCTY fully 
employed beyond 2001. It is reasonable to assume that the lCTY jurisprudence 
will have an impact on the development of the law of armed conflict for some 
time to come, particularly as this jurisprudence is analyzed in foreign ministries, 
defense departments, and academic journals. 
It is practicable to make preliminary assessments of what has happened to 
date. The various and continuing efforts of the several ICTY Chambers to 
grapple with the extreme complexity of the facts in the Yugoslav conflict(s) to 
determine the applicable law are, it is suggested, to be commended rather than 
criticized. The simplistic approaches of much scholarly writing in this area have 
produced convenient but essentially unreasoned solutions. For obvious 
reasons, no one raised the issue of whether or not World War II was a "war" in 
the trials following that conflict. Most contemporary conflicts do raise issues 
related to conflict classification, and these issues must be faced as long as the 
bodies of law applicable to international and internal conflicts differ in 
complexity and sophistication, as they do at present. The approach of the 
Appeals Chamber to elaborating upon customary law applicable to all conflicts, 
individual criminal responsibility for offenses committed in internal conflicts, 
arid customary law in internal conflicts will have an enormous impact on the 
future jurisprudence of the lCTI'. It may also, to the extent it is viewed as 
credible by outside observers, precipitate and contribute to a long,term trend 
toward the development of a uniform body of customary law applicable to all 
conflicts. The "two box" approach to the law of armed conflict for international 
and internal conflict is a viable teaching tool but presents substantial 
difficulties when applied to a refractory reality. 
The work of the ICTY in elaborating upon the meaning and scope of crimes 
against humanity, command responsibility, the defense of duress, and the 
doctrine of reprisals has begun, but much remains to be done concerning these 
and other issues. It is unlikely that defendants in future cases will decline to 
raise the defense oflegitimate reprisal when the single relevant decision to date 
has been made in a Rule 61 proceeding. It is also unlikely that defendants will 
decline to raise the defense of duress when the Appeals Chamber ruling in 
Erdemovic has been so hotly contested. Further, bearing in mind the mixed 
civilian and military leadership roles of several of the accused now in custody, 
the lCTI' will be compelled to assess the extent to which the doctrine of 
command responsibility applies to civilian leaders. 
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It is also reasonable to assume that the ICTY will make a substantial 
contribution to the law concerning the conduct of hostilities. Three 
observations are relevant in this regard. First, to the extent practicable, the 
lCTY OTP has paid due heed to the ruling of the Appeals Chamber in the T adic 
Jurisdiction decision and has attempted to frame charges which are applicable 
to both international and internal armed conflicts. One example is Count 3 of 
the Amended Indictment against General Blaskic, which charges him with "an 
unenumerated Violation of the Laws or Customs of War, as recognized by 
Articles 3, 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal and Customary Law, 
Article 51 (2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 (2) of Additional Protocol 
II (unlawful attack on civilians)."64 One potential result of this charging 
practice is that the Chambers will respond by developing substantially uniform 
standards for all forms of conflict. 
Second, it is probable that the Chambers will consider for the first time 
charges such as inflicting terror on the civilian population. Acts or threats of 
violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian" 
population are prohibited by both Article 51 (2) of Protocol I and Article 13 (2) 
of Protocol II. The dictionary defines terror as "extreme fear," but many lawful 
acts in armed conflict cause extreme fear. The prohibition must, therefore, 
refer to unlawful acts or unlawful threats of violence, the primary purpose of 
which is to spread extreme fear among the civilian population. Threats to wipe 
out a city or to exterminate its population would be clear examples of 
prohibited threats. Whether or not unlawful acts do in fact spread terror 
among the civilian population can be determined by psychological evidence; 
whether or not the primary purpose of unlawful acts is to spread terror can be 
inferred from the circumstances. For example, conducting cat,and,mouse 
sniping against the civilians of a besieged city whereby some civilians would be 
attacked on a random basis and all civilians would be in a constant state of 
extreme fear would appear to be an example of a deliberate attempt to spread 
terror. 
Third, it is possible that a body of law based on the uncodified concept of 
crimes against humanity will be developed in parallel with the existing law 
concerning the conduct of hostilities. It would be practicable to prosecute 
certain attacks against the enemy as crimes against humanity contrary to 
Article 5 of the Statute. The Report of the Secretary General discussing the 
ICTY Statute states in part that "crimes against humanity refer to inhumane 
acts of a very serious nature, such as wilful killing, torture or rape, committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on 
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.,,65 Although there is no 
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precedent for crimes against humanity charges related to attacks against the 
enemy, there would not appear to be any conceptual barrier against using such 
charges in appropriate circumstances. The most appropriate charges would 
appear to be under Article 5 (a) for attacks where death occurs, and under 
Article 5 (i) for other injuries including mental suffering. It would be essential 
to establish that the prohibited acts were committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population. If the ICTY does elaborate a 
body of law for the conduct of hostilities based on an imprecise concept of 
crimes against humanity and, at a minimum, independent of conflict 
classification, the relatively precise law of armed conflict may be shaken to its 
foundations. 
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